Focusing primarily on Plato, Aristotle, and the Pyrrhonian skeptics, Fine discusses the following questions, among others: does Socrates, in the Apology, claim to know that he knows nothing? How do Plato and Aristotle conceive of doxa and epistêmê? Are doxa and epistêmê belief and knowledge as we conceive of them nowadays? Do Plato and Aristotle allow us to have doxa of everything about which we can have epistêmê? How does Plato conceive of perception in the Phaedo and in Theaetetus 184-6? How should we understand his theory of recollection in the Phaedo? Do the Pyrrhonian skeptics disavow all beliefs? Do they have a conception of purely subjective experience? Do they take anything to be subjective? Are they external world skeptics? How do their views of subjectivity and skepticism compare with Descartes'? Taken as a whole, the essays explain why ancient epistemology is instructive and illuminating for us today.
This volume draws together notable work on ancient epistemology by a leading figure in the field. In these thirteen essays Gail Fine discusses knowledge, belief, subjectivity, and scepticism in Plato, Aristotle, and the Pyrrhonian sceptics, relating ancient discussions of these topics to more recent ones.
