Robert Myers presents an original moral theory which charts a course between the extremes of consequentialism and contractualism. He puts forward a radically new case for the existence of both agent-neutral and agent-relative values, and gives an innovative answer to the question how such disparate values can be weighed against each other. Practical judgement is shown to be guided in this by two very different ideals: an ideal of cooperation, which is held to shape the content of morality's demands, and one of self-governance, which is held to determine the nature of reason's requirements. Examination of the ideal of cooperation reveals that principles of impartial beneficence and rights protecting individual freedoms are equally fundamental to morality. Examination of the ideal of self-governance reveals that morality's dictates, though not necessarily overriding, are always in an important sense inescapable. The result is a theory of morality which combines a balanced account of its content with a ringing affirmation of its authority.
Robert Myers presents a moral theory which charts a course between the extremes of consequentialism and contractualism. He argues a case for the existence of both agent-neutral and agent-relative values, and answers the question of how such disparate values can be weighed against each other.
