Ever since the Supreme Court began enforcing the First Amendment's religion clauses in the 1940s, courts and scholars have tried to distil the meaning of those clauses into a useable principle of religious freedom. In this highly original work, Smith criticizes the main positions in the debate and explains their misconceptions. He argues that efforts to find a principle of religious freedom in the "original meaning" are fruitless because the clauses were purely jurisdictional in nature: they were meant to place authority over questions of religion with the states, and nothing more. Contending that the perennial quest to distil religious freedom into a "principle," is futile, Smith advocates a fundamental reassessment of the premises upon which courts have proceeded in this area.
Ever since the Supreme Court began enforcing the First Amendment's religion clauses in the 1940s, courts have tried to distil the meaning of those clauses into a usable principle of religious freedom. This work intersects the fields of politics, law, and religion to criticize the main positions in the debate and explain their misconception.
