Corporate governance has time and again been the subject of extensive scrutiny and controversy. Much of the debate of the 1960s and 1970s focused on the managerial corporation in the USA and the UK, inspired by the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932). The separation of ownership from control has been blamed for spectacular business failures. While there is ample evidence about corporate governance and performance in the USA and the UK, very little is known about the functioning of corporate governance elsewhere. "Corporate Governance and Economic Performance" presents evidence about corporate governance and performance in a large number of countries. It is the result of a collective research effort by the members of the European Corporate Governance Network (ECGN), which brought together 'country teams' familiar with the language and corporate culture of their respective countries. The volume focuses on Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While the 'owner--manager conflict' appears to dominate in the USA and the UK, the 'large--small shareholder' conflict is important in Continental Europe. Based on this evidence, the authors derive important policy implications for capital market reform in Europe.
This book analyses the linkages between corporate governance and economic performance, and contains evidence from both English and local language studies conducted in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Based on this evidence, the authors derive important policy implications for capital market reform in Europe.
