A thoughtful and provocative meditation on both the potential and limits of constitutionalism. In the early twenty-first century, constitutionalism confronts numerous pressures and critiques. Some prominent critics are concerned that constitutionalism’s modern form, in which high courts play a large role, limits popular self-governance. By committing their nations to detailed social and economic policies—from neoliberal requirements for balanced budgets to constitutionalized social welfare and environmental rights—many modern constitutions might make promises they cannot keep and be unduly rigid in the face of changing social, economic, and environmental conditions. Meanwhile, the rise of proto-authoritarian elected leaders around the world shows that constitutions are vulnerable to, and may even enable, democratic backsliding. Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric argue that addressing each of these serious concerns through constitutional design and innovation is potentially valuable, but paradoxically, every remedy also carries with it the possibility that it will intensify the very conditions it seeks to ameliorate. Instead, Tushnet and Bugaric propose a “thin” idea of constitutionalism and suggest that we should scale back our expectations for what constitutionalism can achieve. Political mobilization, led by people attuned to the economic and cultural causes of democratic backsliding, is a better bet.
