The editors (all professors of political science at Texas A&M U.) present nine papers that apply game theory to understandings of how Supreme Court justices act within their institutional context, both in horizontal relation to Congress and the states and hierarchical relation to the US Court of Appeals and other judicial bodies. Among the topics addressed in relation Congress and the states are strategic versus attitudinal explanations for constitutional and statutory decisions, the role of interest groups as links between courts and legislatures, transparency as principle driver of compliance with court rulings, and state self-regulation of trade as a reflection of a weak court that strategically deploys the Commerce Clause to achieve its ends. The book then considers vertical interactions in papers that discuss lower court failure to follow precedent as a strategic opportunity for the Supreme Court to retool decisions it no longer agrees with, the idea that the court system as a whole has multiple "principles" that influence Supreme Court decisions on the environment, and other topics. Annotation 2007 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
