Regulatory Politics and Electric Utilities : A Case Study in Political Economy

3,500 TWD
會員價
3,150
English

Product Description

Traditional theories hold that regulatory agencies act mainly as champions of the interest they are meant to oversee. Anderson looks at regulation within the fast-changing environment. By adding the external political and internal bureaucratic variables he evaluates the capture theory.

Traditional theories hold that regulatory agencies act mainly as champions of the interest they are meant to oversee. Anderson looks at regulation within the fast-changing environment. By adding the external political and internal bureaucratic variables he evaluates the capture theory.

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